European countries in which universities rely on public funding increasingly follow the lead of the United Kingdom and run Research Assessment Exercises. Given the subjective nature of such evaluations, some scientists prefer verifiable measures such as citation counts. This, however, also is prone to problems since the number of cites is correlated, among others, with the order of appearance in an issue. In particular, leading papers are more cited. It is, thus, difficult to assess whether they are of better quality, or whether this happens because they appear first in an issue. We make use of a natural experiment that was carried out by a journal in which papers are randomly ordered in some issues, while this order is at the editors' discretion in other issues. Our estimates suggest that approximately two thirds of the additional cites are due to going first, and one third to higher quality. JEL classification: A10.
Introduction
More and more European countries in which universities rely on public funding follow the lead of the United Kingdom where university departments are rated in so-called Research Assessment Exercises. In these assessments, peer review is used to establish quality ratings that determine the amount of public funding each department will receive Given the financial consequences of these ratings, it is not surprising that they generated a lively debate about how research quality should be measured:
1 some scientists suggest to rely on more objective and verifiable measures, such as cites or publications counts. This would make it possible to replace peer assessments by a more mechanical method, which links research funding to electronically calculated cites or publications, but also raises the important question of how reliable bibliometric measures are as a way of judging the quality of research.
Other scientists support the subjective assessments by panels of experts, despite the fact that self-interest of experts might bias their assessment (Clerides et al., 2008) or that experts might use suboptimal sources of information when forming their judgement. Oswald (2007) for example suggests experts should be using the number of cites of articles rather than journal titles as quality indicators. This is based, among others, on his finding that some 16% of articles appearing in less prestigious journals such as the Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, or the Journal of Industrial Economics end up getting more cites than the median cites of an article in the American Economic Review or Econometrica. He argues that nothing prevents using cites which are also reasonably easy to retrieve and can be provided by those who are evaluated, 2 though he warns that the order in which articles appear within the same volume of a journal might influence the number of cites. While this is not Oswald's (2007) main concern, he suggests that 'the way in which [editors] arranged the order of publication, . . . turned out, ex post, to . . . what now looks like prior foresight' about which papers are good and which are less so. According to Oswald it is worth exploring 'what editors know, and exactly how they know it' when they make their ordering decision.
This ordering issue is well documented in the literature (Smart and Waldfogel, 1996; Ayres and Vars, 2000; Hudson, 2007) raising the possibility that the leading article in an issue of a journal attracts more cites than others. Pinkowitz (2000) draws the same conclusion based on web site downloads of articles that are (pre) published on the website of the Journal of Finance.
The hypothesis is tested by running regressions of the number of cites (or downloads) of an article on the order in which it is placed, and on some other variables, such as time since publication, journal, and subject area (Ayres and Vars, 2000) , as well as number of authors, self-cites, and whether it is the author's first paper (Hudson, 2007) .
3 They all find that the order of a paper in an issue matters, and that leading articles generate more cites. The number of pages has also a positive impact, whereas notes are much less cited. Hudson (2007) finds that self-citations generate more cites, since they provide additional signals with respect to the quality of the paper. He also points out that a highly cited paper has a positive impact on the cites of other papers in the same issue. According to Hudson, this highlights, 'the role chance can play in determining cite impact'.
Chance is also at play in other contexts in which evaluation is partly subjective. Ginsburgh and Van Ours (2003) competition, the (randomly picked) order in which pianists perform has an effect on the final ranking. Lee (2008) observes that an outlier aversion bias affects the way judges perceive quality in figure skating competitions. Coupé (2007) finds that there is little correlation between best paper prizes granted by peers and number of cites they receive.
The European Economic Review (EER) provides a 'natural experiment' that could be used to study whether leading papers are more cited because they lead, or because they are of higher quality. Between 1975 and 1997 some EER issues use the initial of the first author's surname to order papers (the issues in which the order is alphabetical are reported in Appendix Table A2 ), others do not. 4 As long as one is ready to accept that the alphabetical order is random, in the sense that on average it cannot help sorting good and bad papers, 5 this can be considered a natural experiment. If in alphabetically ordered issues, leading papers get more cites than others, then one can wonder whether editors really have a good guess at quality when they use their judgment to order. Leading papers are more cited because they are leading (and/or readers expect them to be better), and not because they are of better quality.
Analysis
Our analysis is based on a comparison of the number of cites conditional on ordering, in the two types of publication strategies: random v. selectively ordered.
To check for consistency, we will also compare this with cites to papers in American Economic Review (AER), where the order is never alphabetical (except by chance).
6
Special issues (such as EER and AER Papers and Proceedings, International Seminars on Macroeconomics or Microeconomics that EER was publishing once a year) as well as editorials that appear as first paper in some issues are excluded.
7 Table 1 gives a first view on the average number of cites conditional on order. The results show that in all cases, the first paper in an issue gets more cites, Ayres and Vars (2000, pp.444-5) using law reviews, but they pooled different journals, some of which were using the alphabetical order, some were not. 5 Note that some papers (for example, Einav and Yariv, 2006) suggest that authors whose names appear early in the alphabet are more likely to receive tenure. There seems thus to be discrimination on the basis of the initial of the surname. There is also a small probability that alphabetical and quality orderings are identical. 6 The order may have been random before 1985, at a time where the journal had a large backlog of papers, and some papers were published when ready for publication, and in that order. The fact that there was a large backlog at the time is mentioned in the editor's report in American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 73 (1983, p.402 ), but nothing is mentioned about the way papers were ordered in the various issues. However, to make sure that we do not capture volumes with randomly ordered papers, we only take into account volumes that were published after 1985, a time at which a new editor was appointed. 7 Editorials are ignored, and the paper that follows is considered as leading paper. Nobel lectures which appear as leading papers in AER have not been removed. but standard deviations are very large. In contrast, the difference in cites with the second ordered paper is not very large. Finally, cites per paper are rather constant after the fifth paper, though some 'irregularities' occur such as the tenth paper in EER (non-alphabetical ordering) and in AER, which both get a larger number of cites than the first ordered paper.
8 But other variables than order may be at play, and we are led to estimate the following model:
where subscript a refers to a given article, y is the number of times this article is cited, 9 the O i a are dummy variables representing the order in which article a appears in an issue of the journal (O i a is equal to 1 if the order in which paper a is published is i, i = 1, 2, . . . , m), A is the number of authors of paper a, L is its length (number of pages), N is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the article is a note or comment, the Y are annual dummies that capture the time at which the article was published, and u an error term; , , , , and are parameters.
Both the order in which an article appears and the year in which it was published are represented by dummies to avoid assumptions on the functional form according to which a paper gains (or looses) cites given its order and age.
10 After some experimentation, and because the observed differences in cites counts Tables A1 and A2 for descriptive statistics concerning the dataset.
9 Number of cites in 2000 to papers published at the latest in 1997. There is thus at least a three-year lag between cites count and date of publication. 10 We ran regressions with time and time squared. This had very little influence on the 'order' parameters that we are interested in here. We also experimented with functional forms of order in a volume. See Appendix Tables A3 to A5. remain roughly equal (and unrelated to order) beyond the fourth or fifth paper in an issue, we decided to report our results with m = 5 only. Since cites are count data, the equations are estimated using the Poisson regression model. The results of three regressions (two for EER, one for AER) are reported in Table 2 . Since the estimates of count models (reproduced in column (1) of Appendix Tables A3-A5) are difficult to interpret, Table 2 reports only the estimated marginal effects.
11 The table also includes the mean number of cites predicted by the Poisson regression at the mean of each right-hand side variable.
Results show that leading papers get marginally more cites in all three types of journals (EER alphabetically ordered, EER non-alphabetically ordered, and AER). As expected, the mean for AER is much larger than for EER (23 v. 5), and though the marginal effects show that the first paper in an issue benefits from a larger number of cites, the difference between AER and EER papers is not very large (5 v. 2 or 3). Moreover, for EER the difference in the marginal effect on cites of the first paper is not very different for alphabetical and non-alphabetical issues (1.9 v. 2.8), though a likelihood ratio test shows that the difference is statistically significantly different from zero. Thus, the lead article when editors exercise discretion is of better quality, but cite numbers overstate how much better it is. Based on our estimates, two thirds of the effect (1.9/2.8) is the result of going first, while one third only can be attributed to better quality. Note that while there is no difference between first and second paper in AER, for EER cites decrease after the first paper. See Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.669) . For the parameters picked by dummy variables such as order, the marginal effect is computed as the effect of changing the value of the dummy from 0 to 1. 12 It also worth mentioning that between 1985 and 1997, all AER papers that appear in order one to eight get cites and only 2% and 4% of papers ordered 9th and 10th respectively, are not cited. This is far from being the case in EER, where some 15% of the papers never get cited, irrespective of their order.
Long papers are more cited than short ones, and notes are usually less cited (for AER the difference is quite large). The sequence of annual dummies which represent the year of publication, and thus the age of the paper in 2000, pick coefficients that are declining in the case of AER. Thus, as can be expected, recent papers get less cites. The coefficients show no particular trend for EER. One possible reason may be that the natural decrease of cites for more recent papers is compensated by more cites due to increasing average quality over time.
The ordering by the initial of the name may not be entirely random, since, in economics, names usually appear in alphabetical order. It is thus possible that lead papers in alphabetically ordered issues are more likely to be coauthored. To the extent that such papers get more cites, either because they are of better quality or because of more self-citations, our lead article effects may simply capture the influence of a larger number of coauthors. We checked for this by including the number of authors as a variable. Its effect is positive and highly significant in the case of discretionary ordering, both in EER and AER, but insignificant in alphabetical issues. More importantly, however, the inclusion of this variable in our equations, even when highly significant, did not change the sign and significance of our main variable of interest. It thus suggests that the effect we estimate is purely a 'lead article effect'.
As a robustness check, a series of additional regressions were carried out, which confirm the results described above. We changed m (the number of ordered papers), replaced annual dummies by some imposed functional form of time between publication and cites in 2000 (linear and quadratic), and varied the number of volumes of both journals included in the regressions. 
Conclusions
There currently is a lively debate between scientists: some prefer peer review based research assessments, while others think that bibliometric citation-based methods should be used as a verifiable mechanism to distribute public research funds. Since the quality of research is not observed it is hard to say which approach is preferable. In this paper, however, we show that even more objective methods are not perfect and should be used with care. This conclusion is based on the (probably unintentional) natural experiment run by European Economic Review. Our estimates show that approximately two thirds of the additional cites that leading papers get seem to be due to the effect of going first, while only one third can be considered a genuine quality effect of the editors' discretionary choice. Hence, given that most editors rank articles on the basis of their personal quality assessment, even objective citation counts have an important subjective component. The fact that leading articles get more cites just because they are leading may be costly for young scientists, since well-established (and highly cited) scientists may get more cites than what they truly deserve: their reputation makes it more likely that their articles are placed as lead articles. This practice may result in intensifying the emergence of 'superstars', help conservatism, and even crowd out some good articles by younger scientists who do not get properly cited.
This can have some influence if individuals have to be rated or promoted, but the effect is smoothed out at the department and journal level. Since the ranking of journals is itself based on the average number of citations they receive, there is little reason for Research Assessment Exercises to take into account citations counts rather the quality of journals.
The appearance of new electronic journals, as well as the fact that old-time paper journals become electronic may induce changes in these patterns. Scientists are now becoming used to download individual papers, and have, in general, no access to the issues of a journal (though the journal still exists, even if virtually, and papers are ordered in each issue). But the fact that paper copies do not lie on the desk of a scientist will certainly have an influence on citations. The observation made by Hudson that a well-cited paper enhances cites to other papers in the same issue as well as the effect that being first in a volume increases the number of cites, though the article may not be of higher quality, may disappear. In the future, citations may become a better measure of quality than the reputation of a journal. 1980 132, 142, 143 1983 213, 222, 223, 231, 232, 233 1984 241, 242, 243, 252, 253, 261, 263 1985 291, 292, 293 1987 315, 316, 317, 318 1988 321 1989 338 1992 368 1995 392, 396, 397, 399 1996 406, 406 1997 416, 417, 419 
